MARKETS
, political economists have shown that capital mobility-how capital flows across regions or sectors of production-has redistributional effects. Redistributional effects, in turn, elicit lobbying and rent seeking on the part of potential winners and losers. 1 However, political economists are working with a notion of capital mobility that is more appropriate to machinery and the buildings that house them (production capital) than to financial assets (financial capital).
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They ask how much it would take to relocate or convert an existing unit of capital to a different use. Applied to financial assets, this rule of thumb yields the conclusion that financial capital is perfectly mobile within the confines of a national economy. Consequently, asset holders are seen as irrelevant to policymaking, since they are more likely to bail out of a poorly performing sector than to join the ranks of its labor and management in lobbying for government aid. Jeffry Frieden writes: "Assets that are not specific at all are those that can easily be redeployed-demand deposits, financial assets more generally. Holders of completely liquid assets are indifferent to policy, for they can move their funds to whatever activity is earning the highest rate of return" (1991, p. 21) . 3 This view has led political scientists to neglect the study of financial markets. 1 See Gilligan 1994 and Alt et al. 1996 for a review of the literature.
2 A standard estimate of capital mobility is R&D expenses; see Alt et al. 1999 . One exception to the neglect of financial capital is Schonhardt-Bailey and Bailey 1995.
3 See also Frieden and Rogowski 1996. 4 Terminology matters. Corporate securities markets deal in long-term instruments (stocks and bonds) issued by corporations. The market for long-term securities is also referred to in textbooks as the capital market, in contrast to the money market, which includes short-term instruments (short-term bonds, commercial paper, bank notes, certificates of deposit, derivatives, and so forth). The two financial markets are integrated, as any long-term instrument can serve as collateral to short-term transactions or provide the basis for derivatives. Corporate refers to the non-government component of the market, which for the most advanced industrialized countries only emerged in the second half of the 19th century.
Such neglect rests on false premises. Financial assets may not always be mobile, even in the age of fast communication. Financial capital mobility has redistributional effects, creating winners and losers, the former with an incentive to lobby for the deregulation of capital, the latter for rules to curtail such mobility. It is quite plausible that financial regulation plays the same role within the national borders as exchange controls across borders, viz. to curb the free circulation of funds across sectoral or regional boundaries.
The emergence of modern capital markets in the 19th century offers a dramatic illustration of how legislation can regulate the flow of capital. The second industrial revolution, characterized by large immobilization of capital, was financed by corporate security markets. Markets allowed banks to transform long-term loans to industry into securities, recoup their liquidity, and lend anew. Still, few individuals were willing to merely take over corporate financing from the banks and immobilize their savings into risky private ventures. The creation of a secondary market for corporate securities, allowing the owner of a security to sell it at any time, is what earned markets their mass appeal. Secondary security markets, however, needed-and still do-a lot of liquid assets to function well. Stable, reliable pricing requires thick trading, the constant short-term buying and selling by brokers, other intermediaries, and leveraged speculators, in constant need of vast sums of short funds. Where did markets find all this cash in the second half of the 19th century? The fact is that markets did not always find the required cash, not so much because it was scarce than because it was locked into the noncorporate sectors, such as governments, agriculture, and small business.
Existing accounts of the origins of corporate security markets neglect redistributional issues. Besides the obvious role played by economic development, current accounts stress the respective roles of investment information and of government in absorbing the fixed costs involved in setting up securities markets. Common law, another argument goes, is more apt than civil law at reducing contracting uncertainty between the parties to a security issue. Common law countries, therefore, have larger corporate security markets than civil law countries. Without dismissing the role played by these factors, I point to redistributional issues. I argue that 19 th century stock markets constituted, along with large commercial banks, a new "corporate finance," geared to the financial needs of the new industrial sectors. Land and other traditional sectors, in contrast, had no use for it, but, instead, were banking with the non-profit sector (savings banks, credit cooperatives, and mortgage banks). The two financial sectors were in competition for resources. The competition was adjudicated politically, through regulation. The outcome reflected the degree of political power of local governments, that is, the degree of decentralization of the state.
Corporate securities, I show, flourished only in centralized states.
The present argument also has implications for financial internationalization. Cross-border financial capital mobility, like securitization, rested on domestic financial capital mobility. Securitization and internationalization, I show, were correlated.
I first present the literature on security markets, introduce my argument, and then test it. I establish a link between within-border and cross-border financial capital mobility in a penultimate section and last conclude.
Current Accounts
Only recently have political economists sought comparative explanations for the cross-national variation in corporate security markets. (Sylla and Smith 1995, p. 182) . A larger pool of savings implied a higher demand for investment instruments.
A second explanation stresses the negative impact of information asymmetry between investor and entrepreneur on securities market development. Richard Sylla and David Smith (1995) account for the staggered fortunes of the London and New York stock markets over time as reflecting different timing in the adoption of rules favoring the disclosure of financial information and curtailing insider trading on privileged information. Jonathon Baskin and Paul Miranti (1997, p. 160) argue that the heavy reliance on bonds as opposed to common stocks in the 19th century reflected investors' risk aversion in an investment environment characterized by poor information.
A third explanation points to the role of fixed costs and government.
Efficient stock markets, in addition to a building and special phone lines, require well-informed investors, reliable intermediaries, and reputable debtors.
More importantly, they need to be liquid-demand must elicit supply, and supply must meet demand at all times and at low costs. There is "a chicken and egg problem with liquidity," Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales aptly write, "people will not trade in a particular market unless they think the market is liquid, but the market will not be liquid unless they trade" (1999, p. 17) . Private entrepreneurs and investors could not overcome this free riding problem without government support. Corporate securities markets developed in the wake of public debt markets and railway bond markets, which were organized, guaranteed, or promoted by governments.
In turn, the government ability to build a large public debt market rested on the government's promise to repay. Looking at England, several scholars Cecco 1974 and Neal 1994 . Se also Michie 1997. The present paper de-emphasizes the global links, stressing instead indigenous development.
have argued that the switch from absolutist to parliamentary rule made such a promise credible (Dickson 1967 , Brewer 1989 , North and Weingast 1989 , Jones 1994 . Whereas it was difficult for a monarch holding the crown by divine right to commit not to repudiate past engagements, parliamentary rule, by securing individual rights and including wealth holders in the policymaking process, offered the required guarantee and reduced investment risk. The public debt was then instrumental in the latter acceptance of the private debt.
France and Spain, who remained absolutist for another century, were unable to match British financial resources.
Induced from one observation, the checks-and-balances thesis lacks generality. Richard Sylla (1997 Sylla ( , 1999 has offered an opposite account of the American Revolution. The source of the inefficiency resided not in absolutism, as in pre-Revolutionary England, but in excessive decentralization-each colony floated its own debt, fueling inflation and currency depreciation. The new constitution of 1787 solved the problem by giving the federal government the power of taxation. The US debt became popular with foreign investors, and, upon retirement, was replaced by the equity of incorporated business enterprises. Too many checks and balances could be as bad as not enough.
By 1815, in any case, most regimes in Europe, Russia excepted, had some form of checks and balances limiting monarchs' powers. As the theory would predict, these regimes had a debt that was traded both at home and abroad.
However, the issuing of corporate securities was unevenly distributed across countries. Relatively high in France, Belgium, and Switzerland, it was low in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Scandinavia. In Spain and Italy, a surfeit of public debt had the opposite effect of crowding out private debt. In Germany, the Junkers did their best to choke speculation, and with it, stock exchanges. The checks and the balances were insufficient when the public debt did not tail off and when policymakers did not favor the development of stock markets.
More fundamentally, checks and balances may not always favor corporate securitization. Checks and balances devolve veto power to small coalitions, including those opposing corporate finance.
The fourth and most recent theoretical foray into the growth of stock markets emphasizes the common law or civil law origin of the legal system.
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1997a) have shown that countries with poorer investor protections against expropriation by insiders, as reflected by legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These rules and the quality of their enforcement, they show, vary systematically by legal origin-common law and civil law. In the common law system, the judge de facto makes the law, whereas in the civil law system, it is the legislator. Civil law systems are further divided into three families-French, German, and Scandinavian types. Common law countries, the authors argue, protect shareholders the most, French civil law countries the least, and German and Scandinavian civil law countries somewhere in the middle. Law enforcement is also lowest in French civil law countries (La Porta et al. 1998 ).
The legal origin argument has the merit to provide a rationale for a wellknown, yet poorly understood, stylized fact-the greater market-orientation of Anglo-Saxon countries. Furthermore, the direction of the causal relationship, if any, is beyond doubt-legal systems were adopted either long ago or in response to conquest or colonization (La Porta et al. 1998 , p. 1126 century, the masses following the market crash of the 1930s. The decentralized nature of law making in a common law system, they argue, makes it more difficult for the government to alter the status quo (1999, pp. 6-7) . In sum, common law is friendlier toward markets than civil law; it is also a better shield against market foes.
I share Rajan and Zingales' idea that security markets suffer when governments tamper with financial mobility. Government intervention is usually motivated by the purpose of compensating market losers. Not all market losers get compensated, however-only those that are politically smart. Inept ones have no chance to entice politicians to prevent capital from freely roaming the land and limit, reverse, or avert the potential losers' loss.
Sorting the smart from the inept is where the theoretical difficulty lies.
Economists traditionally endogenize politics by equating power with wealth.
Political scientists, instead, customarily point to the selection bias introduced by institutions, a bias that wealth alone cannot circumvent. The present argument belongs to the second tradition. The next section recalls the early days of corporate security finance, maps its potential winners and losers, and assesses the institutional capacity each group had to press their preferences on governments.
Policy Preference Formation: Traditional against Corporate Finance
The second half of the 19th century was characterized by a change in the scale of production that opened a gap between modern industrial sectors and traditional sectors. Traditional sectors included agrarian, artisans, shopkeepers, self-employed, workers skilled in traditional crafts and, more generally, sectors characterized by small enterprises. and local non-profit, were subsidized, paying no taxes and benefiting, in the case of savings banks, from a state guarantee on collected deposits.
[ Table 1 ]
The financial innovation of the late-19th century led to the growth in market share of the center banks. They absorbed the country banks and began to attract individual deposits which, until then, had been with the local non-profit sector.
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The disappearance of the country banks accentuated the specialization of banking. In the first half of the century, earlier in Britain, the wealthy banked with the center banks (mostly private back then), the poor with the savings banks, and all the intermediate groups banked with the country banks. As the latter merged or were absorbed, their clienteles parted ways; industrial sectors on the rise logically went to the center banks, whereas agrarians and small business fell back on the non-profit sector.
Consider the case of the agrarians first. They had little to gain from incorporation and stock markets. Niel Koning (1994, p. 26) where mechanization allowed farms to be larger than in Europe, farms were family-owned, with no prospect for incorporation.
Farmers had no use for the newly established joint-stock banks either.
The center banks could not accommodate farmers' demand for long-term finance, needed for land purchase, mechanization, or land improvement.
Borrowing short, these banks could not easily lend long, otherwise, a rise in interest would force them to pay high interest to depositors while still collecting low interests on borrowers (interest risk). The absence of secondary market in loans also made it impossible for a banker to liquidate farm loans, were he in need of doing so (liquidity risk). The situation was different for industrial firms, as a banker could usually recoup long-term advances to an industrial firm by turning them into shares.
would finance mortgage loans by issuing default-free bonds. (4) Private mortgage securitization, similar to the precedent, but without public guarantee, was practiced in Anglo-Saxon countries.
The first three mechanisms shared three characteristics: they were nonprofit and tax-exempt; they benefited from a guarantee on their liabilities, supplied by solidarily-responsible peers in cooperatives and local or central governments in the other two; and they were stable. The fourth mechanism, in contrast, was for-profit, unsecured by government, and unstable; mostly encountered in the United States and British Dominions, it rarely managed to outlast more than one-two at best-business cycles. Kenneth Snowden My point is not that local, small enterprises were unable to get loans from the local branch of a large center bank; after all, the business of the local agent of a center bank was not merely to collect savings but also to sell loans. Local agents, however, were not as free as local bankers to meet the financial needs of local firms, which generally differed from the needs of large firms.
Too small to enable market investors to evaluate their earning potential with a modicum of confidence, small-and medium-sized firms had to rely on bank loans, and more specifically on "relationship banking" (Lamoreaux 1994, Petersen and Rajan 1995) . A durable relationship spread across a wide array of products allowed the bank to smoothen the cost of capital to the firm over the firm's life cycle. Center banks' local agents, however, could not commit to a long-term relationship. They had to meet lending standards decided by headquarters, with the consequence that their portfolio had to be flexible enough to meet liquidity requirements that kept changing with the overall position of the bank. Headquarters would typically make it difficult for local branch directors to fill in the shoes of country bankers. As headquarters often could not trust the local directors to enforce the lending preferences of their bank, the former multiplied impersonal decision criteria. Like French prefects, local agents were rotated, for promotion purposes but also to prevent local mores from eroding the bank's corporate culture. As a result, the center banks' capacity to tap local information networks-trade suppliers, chamber of commerce-was limited. Finally, a bank was unlikely to invest in a longterm relationship with a firm if the firm, in turn, could not credibly commit not to defect from the relationship once it would grow out of its early teething problems. A time-honored way of enforcing relationship banking is the existence of a banking monopoly able to enforce exclusivity over the long run. Rarely, though, did center-bank branch directors enjoy a local monopoly. governments. Local firms needed local banks to satisfy their specific investment demand, local banks needed the political protection of local governments to hold back competition from the center banks, and local governments needed prosperous local banks and firms to maintain their relative fiscal independence from, and power vis-à-vis, the central government.
1 Not all peripheral districts would necessarily suffer from the centralization of capital markets. Those districts that accommodated the rise of large, vertically-integrated, "autarkic" (in Herrigel's [1996] terminology) firms, which were large enough to efficiently tap equity markets, would not necessarily be harmed by the decline of local, industrial banking, as the rise of large industry would compensate for the decline in craft-oriented sectors. One would expect these districts and the firms to which they were home to espouse the cause of centralization or, at least, be conflicted-indeed, although the large firm provided local employment, its interest in the welfare of its local host was circumstantial and reversible.
Except in those districts, local governments, wherever they enjoyed the power to, sought to block the penetration of the countryside by center banks.
The chosen political arena, in representative regimes, was the upper (lower in Scandinavia) chamber, dedicated to representing the interest of local governments against encroachments of the central government regulatory agencies. The policy vehicle was bank, financial, and related monetary legislation, which, having to be regularly updated, would give an opportunity to the profit and non-profit sectors to denounce, the former, the unfair privileges of the latter, the latter, the monopolistic proclivities of the former.
The central government would most often side with the large banks (and the state banks as well, of course), and a majority of the upper chamber would side with the local banks. Not all constitutions provided for upper chambers, or, even in the case they did, not all of them granted meaningful power to them. In centralized regimes (Britain, France, Belgium), upper chambers were weak, and the debate between center and periphery settled in favor of the center from the outset.
Any measure that tended to increase the market shares of any credit sector other than center banks had the effect of diverting liquidity from the corporate securities market. Two issues mattered: branching and the product mix. Branch banking was regulated in Norway, the United States, and deterred by subsidies to local banks elsewhere.
The product mix-who could sell what-was the subject of regular debate in Italy and Germany. Richard Deeg (1998) has chronicled with wondrous details the German debate on the extent to which the non-taxed, state-guaranteed, nonprofit sector should be allowed to offer services overlapping with those offered by for-profit, taxed, and uninsured banks.
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The present argument yields two empirically observable hypotheses. The first hypothesis ("crowding out") states that local banking crowded out corporate security markets. Capital that was locked in a local financial network was unavailable for redeployment toward the center. The impact of state banking was indeterminate. The second hypothesis ("centralization") posits that the size of the local banking sector, and by extension the size of the corporate securities markets, were a function of state centralization.
The Crowding Out Hypothesis
The crowding-out hypothesis states that the development of corporate security markets was a function of the banking structure; corporate capital markets were starved by a large local banking sector. The dependent variable is the ratio of a country's corporate stocks and bonds to total financial assets. [ Figure 1 ]
The independent variables are the market shares of three sectorscountry, local non-profit, and state-measured in deposits. The choice of deposits over total assets is mandated by the role played by the money market in the hypothesized logical cause. I alternatively use four control variables. GNP per capita is included to control for the demand for securities. I could not directly control for the common law origin of the legal system due to a case of multicolinearity with GNP per capita-Anglo-Saxon countries were the wealthiest of the sample. I used, instead, French civil law origin (France, Belgium, and Italy), a proxy for the legal environment that is considered as the most hostile to security 1 Even then, the combined assets of the 7 to 9 Berliner Groβanken represented 44 percent of forprofit bank assets in 1890, 53 in 1914, and as much as 77 in 1922 (Deutsche Bundesbank 1976, pp. 56-58) . Equivalent data for the 6 to 8 Swiss Groβbanken were 37, 67, and 77 percent respectively (Ritzmann 1973 , Table 1 ). In contrast, the US National banks controlled 50 percent in 1914 (there are no earlier data) and only 46 in 1922 (Bureau of the Census).
markets (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny 1997a). I control for information asymmetry, third; drawing on Baskin and Miranti's (1997) finding that poor information led investors to choose bonds over stocks, poor information is proxied by the proportion of corporate bonds among corporate securities. The relative size of the public debt, fourth, is trickier to model, given its hypothesized opposite effects in the short and long terms. I proxy these two opposite effects with two ratios: public debt/total assets and public debt/financial assets. The intuition is this: The case in which the debt carries little weight in the overall economy as a whole but represents a substantial share of financial assets typifies crowding out. Conversely, a relatively large debt that would represent a comparatively small proportion of all financial assets ratio corresponds to the seeding effect. Further multicolinearity (the bane of small N's research designs) between the last three series of control variables forced me to include them one at a time.
The method is ordinary least squares. All the tests have a small number of observations making them case sensitive-it takes but a few outliers to make or break a correlation. I compensate for this limitation by performing two kinds of diagnostics. I first calculate the DFITS statistic-a measure of the degree to which each observation has a deviant residual or pulls the regression line toward itself. This allows me to identify potential outliers, some mild, some strong. Results are reported in Table 2 . The first result of note is the coefficient for the wealth variable (regression 1). Relative wealth is a powerful determinant of securitization: a one standard deviation increase in GNP per capita (=$262) yields an increase in the dependent variable of almost one (84 percent) standard deviation (=0.09). This is a very powerful impact and an accurate one as well, since the relationship is significant at the 1 percent level.
This finding confirms the historians' hunch that the size of security markets in 1913 reflected levels of development. I will use wealth as a control variable across specifications.
[ Table 2 ]
Of greater interest to the present argument are the coefficients for the various banking sectors. The strongest impact is that of the local non-profit sector. The coefficient is statistically significant (at the 1.1 percent level) and a one standard deviation (=0.37) increase in that variable corresponds to a decrease of almost one (0.82) standard deviation in the dependent variable.
Also significant, but less strong, is the impact of the country bank variable (a 20 percent decrease calculated in standard deviations). Recall that this is a quasi-dummy variable (coded 0.42 for the US, 0 for others). The coefficient indicates that the presence of a large State-chartered banking system in the US had a moderately negative impact on corporate stock holdings. The coefficient for the state bank variable is not significantly different from zero, suggesting no net effect.
1 Each plot generates a coefficient and a fit that are equal to the coefficient and fit of the dependent variable against the chosen right-hand-side variable, while simultaneously controlling for the effect of the other right-hand-side variables on both variables. [ Figure 4 ]
The present findings have one main implication for the institutionalist interpretation advanced by North and Weingast. It may be true that the existence of checks and balances were a requisite for treasuries to issue debt on a large scale. It is also the case, however, that a particular type of checks and balances, decentralization and the concomitant representation of local governments in powerful upper chambers, had a largely negative impact on the development of corporate security markets.
Securitization and Cross-Border Capital Mobility
The development of international markets tends to run parallel to the development of domestic securities markets. Such is the case today. So was it before World War I. Consider the findings reported in Table 4, [ Table 4 Figure 5]
Did securitization invite internationalization, or did internationalization foster securitization? None of the above. Both internationalization and securitization were the product of one common cause-the existence of a broad, centripetal money market, that is, domestic financial capital mobility. It has been shown elsewhere that, like securitization, internationalization was negatively correlated with the market share of the local banking sectors and positively so with state centralization (Verdier 1998) . Combining these results suggests that state centralization, along with economic development, fueled both domestic and cross-border capital mobility.
Summary and Implications
The paper theoretically motivates and empirically demonstrates the existence of financial capital specificity. The industrial revolution touched off a concomitant process of banking concentration and market securitization (corporate finance) that threatened to divert capital from traditional sectors.
In decentralized countries, corporate finance elicited the common opposition of local banks, local governments that ran or regulated these banks, and sectors that were slated to lose from the impending changes in financial systems-land, traditional sectors, and small business. These local coalitions checked the redeployment of liquidity from the periphery toward the center.
The financial center languished, securities markets remained illiquid, and, with the exception of Switzerland, international business remained limited. In centralized countries, in contrast, local coalitions did not form or were impotent because local banks were economically weaker and local governments enjoyed little power. Capital flowed naturally to the financial center, where it helped lubricate the corporate securities markets or found its way in foreign issues. By promoting securities exchanges, geographic capital mobility promoted capital mobility across sectors of production. By promoting internationalization, it promoted cross-border capital mobility.
Financial capital mobility stemmed from an economic fundamental-the level of economic development-and a political fundamental-state centralization. The paper provides strong evidence that political institutions played a role in determining factor mobility. Political economists often claim that factor mobility is responsible for the manner in which lobbying coalitions form. This way of explaining coalition formation and policy outcomes assumes that factor mobility is external to policymaking, viz. reflects technological and global trends.
1 By selecting financial capital, I chose a case in which factor mobility, since the advent of the telegraph, should be the closest one can ever get in practice to textbook perfection. The specificity I found is irrefutable proof that politicians do tamper with financial capital mobility, as they probably do with any other type of factor mobility.
The role played by state centralization helps contextualize existing findings on markets and political regimes. Douglas North and Barry Weingast (1989) argued that the capacity for the monarch to commit to repay the debt was a prerequisite for the emergence of an efficient public, and then private, debt market. Theorizing about England, a centralized state, they missed an equally important requisite-the power of the state to free capital from local networks. The eradication of local financial privileges was necessary to release local capital from its local uses. The absence of a well-functioning security market denied investors the capacity to diversify their investment portfolio beyond the region in which they resided. Holders of securities were unable to exercise "exit," but had to fall back on "voice," to use Albert Hirschman's terminology. Territorial specificity forced investors to join the political fray, both corporate and regulatory. On the corporate side, they became involved in monitoring entrepreneurs. Large lenders exercised monitoring directly, by acquiring controlling positions in firms. Rather than using markets to spread their resources thin over a diversified portfolio, as in countries of high capital mobility, they used markets to concentrate their resources in a few companies and monitor management. Bought at primary auctions, shares were kept indefinitely, stunting growth in the secondary market. Smaller lenders would hold debt in the form of bonds or, when concerned about staying liquid, of bank deposits. Banks would then use the deposits to extend loans to, and monitor, borrowers. For banks too, monitoring required concentrating assets on a limited number of large companies.
Did voice and monitoring stop at board meetings, or were they also directed at government regulators? There is no doubt that agrarian organisations and local governments lobbied for their local banks if they happened to have any. The question is whether lobbying for rents also extended to non-financial policies, such as tariffs and subsidies. Although beyond the empirical scope of this study, a logical implication is that holders of territorially specific financial capital should have lobbied on behalf of the firms and sectors situated in the locales in which they had their investments.
Undiversified Westphalian savers, should have lobbied for rents for Westphalian producers. Diversified savers from Lyons or Birmingham, in contrast, should not. Our knowledge in this area is scanty. We know that German and US bankers had a personal stake in the cartelization of heavy industry and import tariffs to insure revenues against price volatility, whereas
French bankers, let alone bankers from the "City," did not. We also know that all the great parliamentary tariff inquiries that took place around the turn of the century were replete with instances of local representation. The consequences of variations in financial capital mobility for economic policies is a field for future research.
